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The Influence of Refugee Status
on Palestinian Identity and the
Impact of Identity on Durable
Solutions to the Refugee
Problem
Michaela S. Clemens
Abstract: Over the last fifty years the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has
generated massive numbers of refugees. The scale and longevity of the
conflict has made the Palestinian refugee problem the most protracted
and largest refugee situation in the world today (Merhab et al. 2006).
The processes of becoming a refugee and living as a refugee have had
direct impacts on the formation of Palestinian identity. In this paper, I
examine the influence of refugee status on identity and discuss how this
identity affects potential solutions to the protracted refugee situation. I
offer a brief historical background to the creation of Palestinian
refugees. And, I outline what defines a refugee and, more specifically,
a Palestinian refugee. The results of this review indicate that
Palestinian refugee- identity is strongly influenced by a collective sense
of victimization and nationalism. This collective identity is passed on
to subsequent generations living in exile. However, refugee status is
but one factor in the formation of identity - with other factors being
gender, religion, place of exile, and place of origin. The final
discussion also indicates that no easy solution to the refugee problem is
imminent, but that the many components that make up Palestinian
identity should be addressed when seeking solutions to both the refugee
situation and the conflict that generated the refugees.
Introduction

The ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine has
garnered much attention worldwide, resulting in numerous media and
scholarly reports. This conflict is often presented as two parties with
false symmetry, as if Israel and Palestine are simply two nations in
opposition (Sharoni & Abu-Nimer 2004). The real asymmetry can only
be understood by examining each popUlation, Palestinians and Israeli-
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Jews, not simply as opposing political entities, but as distinct national
and cultural identities. This paper focuses specifically on one side of
this asymmetry - Palestinian identity.
Palestinian identity, in
particular, is influenced by the designation of many of its people as
refugees. A large number of these individuals are residing in other
countries in the Middle East, and many others are in refugee
settlements in the highly contested areas of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. The protracted nature of this refugee problem, half a
century in the making, is contributing to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and impeding efforts for peace.
In this paper, I examine the influence of refugee status on the
formation of Palestinian identity. The results of my research indicate
that Palestinian identity is strongly influenced by a sense of
victimization, which is evident by displacement and manifested as a
collective nationalistic identity. It is not my intent, however, to suggest
that there is one identity that comprises the diversity of individuals that
call themselves Palestinian. Therefore, while my focus is on refugee
status, I briefly address other factors that influence Palestinian identity
and contribute to diversity within this group.
In an effort to convey how being designated a refogee would
impact identity, it is important to establish a context; therefore, I
present a brief history, an explanation ofterms, and the implications of
individual and collective identity in the larger scale of the PalestinianIsraeli conflict. The first section of this paper is not a detailed history
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but a historical background to the
creation of Palestinian refugees for the discussion that follows. In
addition, I outline what defines a refugee and more specifically what
defmes a Palestinian refogee. Moreover, I discuss how problems
associated with a prolonged refugee identity contribute to an
asymmetrical power balance between Palestine and Israel and how the
refugee problem is impeding efforts for durable solutions.
The Palestinian Diaspora and the Creation ofPalestinian Refugees

Zionism, the political movement to establish a Jewish
homeland in the Middle East, can be traced as far back as the late
1800s. As Khalidi (1991) notes, the problem with creating a Jewish
homeland in Palestine was that this land was already inhabited.
Palestine, under Ottoman rule until the end of the First World War, was
populated by people that identified themselves as primarily Arabs,
Muslims, and Ottomans (Mi'ari 1998). Zionist colonization persisted,
however, and can be defmed in two major stages.
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The first stage of colonization began in 1918 and culminated
with a civil war in 1948 between the newly founded state ofIsrael and
Arab armies. With Israel's victory, the Palestinian Diaspora began. By
1950, the total number of refugees registered with the United Nations
had reached more than 900,000 (UNRWA website 2006). These
displaced persons were scattered throughout the Arab controlled
territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and into the
neighboring countries of Jordan, Lebanon, and the Syrian Arab
Republic. Additionally, there were 45,800 Palestinians receiving UN
relief aid still living in Israel - people who today we would call
internally displaced persons, or IDPs (UNRWA website 2006). While
crossing an international border is a key distinction between a refugee
and an IDP, Palestinians were caught in unusual circumstances in that,
with the legal formation of the state oflsrael, many Palestinians moved,
but then so did the borders.
The second stage of Zionist colonization began with the June
1967 war and continues into 21 st century. Israel's victory in 1967
gained the state control over East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the
Gaza Strip, "thus taking over 100 percent of historical Palestine"
(Khalidi 1991:9). By 2006, more than fifty years and several
generations later, the Palestinian Diaspora can claim almost 4.3 million
refugees in countries outside of Israel and in the territories of Gaza and
the West Bank (UNRWA website 2006).
In her examination of this situation, Sayigh asserts that many
Palestinian refugees have been displaced over and over again - even
though the big picture is of "two big bangs" of dispersion, scattering
Palestinian peoples across the Middle East (1998:20). She cites
numerous cases of repeated relocations, leading to constant insecurity
and human rights violations. One such example was the nearly 350,000
Palestinians expelled from Kuwait during the Gulf War of 1991-1992,
including 12 families forced to live in the Cairo Airport for over five
months after they were denied entry into Egypt (Sayigh 1998).
Violations of individuals' basic human rights (e.g. forced evictions,
restricted movement, degrading and inhuman treatment, etc.) are at the
core of the refugee problem. However, to understand the rights of
refugees, we must first understand what constitutes a refogee.
The Status and Rights ofPalestinian Refogees

Article 1A of the 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee
as a person who has fled his or her country of nationality for fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion and is unable or unwilling
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to return (Akram 2002). The Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the international agency
charged with protecting refugees and resolving refugee situations, calls
the Palestinian refugee situation "by far the most protracted and largest
of all refugee problems in the world today" (Merhab et al. 2006:112).
The UNHCR Department of International Protection has noted that a
protracted refugee situation is "not a case of length of time but rather an
inability to exercise basic rights and meet essential economic, social
and psychological needs during years in exile. This leads to
deprivation, physical insecurity and exploitation" (UNHCR 2004b:21).
The scale of the Middle East refugee situation is so large that a
separate UN organization was formed in 1949 to deal specifically with
Palestine: the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East, or UNRWA. This agency defines
Palestinian refugees as those "persons whose normal place of residence
was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their
homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli
conflict... UNRWA's definition of a refugee also covers the
descendents of persons who became refugees in 1948" (UNRWA
website 2006).
While the situation of Palestine was in the forefront during the
establishment of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Palestinian refugees
were categorically excluded. Article ID of the Convention states "This
Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving
from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance"
(Akram 2002:39).
Since Palestinian refugees were under the
supervision of the newly formed UNRWA, they were and are not
guaranteed any of the rights and freedoms afforded by the 1951
Refugee Convention or later refugee protocols, nor are they given any
protection or assistance from the UNHCR. In contrast, the UNRWA's
mandate offers basic subsistence (food, clothing, shelter) to registered
refugees, but has no obligation to protect Palestinian refugees from
human rights violations (including the denial of education or
employment, forced eviction, restrictions on movement within a host
state, exploitation, arbitrary arrest, etc.).
Limitations on basic human rights accompany the designation
of an individual as a refugee. In host countries that are often
economically and socially strained, the treatment of refugees may be
far below international expectations (Steiner et al. 2003). Palestinians
refugees found many of their rights constrained by host governments.
In Lebanon in 1982, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs issued a
list of jobs, ranging from banking to barbering, that were henceforth
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closed to foreigners (Peteet 1996). The areas of employment left open
to refugees were in the lowest echelon of income potential (domestic
labor, construction, sanitation, etc.). Likewise in Jordan, the majority
of refugees living inside and out of camps subsist at the lowest
economic level (Sayigh 1998). This economic marginalization extends
even to those Palestinians in the contested territories - where roughly
70 percent of camp refugees and 50 percent of refugees outside of
camps in Gaza are in the lowest economic bracket, and 40 percent in
camps and 20 percent out of camps make up comparable figures in the
West Bank (Sayigh 1998).
Palestinian refugees in Arab countries and in the West Bank
and Gaza are frequently denied access to employment, rights to
property, freedom of religion, primary education, and identity papers
(see Peteet 1996; Shiblak 1996; Sayigh 1998). These are all rights
specifically outlined in the international law from which Palestinians
are excluded. In most refugee situations the principle of nonrefoulement (non-return) seems sacrosanct - as refugees are spared
forced return to their country of origin while their safety is at risk.
Palestinians are the marked exception in that they do not qualify for
any such rights under the 1951 Refugee Convention and return to their
country of origin is their primary goal.
In protracted refugee situations, human rights violations
escalate with time, and refugee settlements, like those in the occupied
territories, can become "incubators for future problems" (UNHCR
2004a:3). As insecurity and instability progress, long-term refugee
situations are particularly vulnerable to militarization. The UNHCR
(1997) asserts that violence is inevitable in refugee settlements where
young males, in particular, are deprived of education, recreation, and
the opportunity to engage in productive activities and are powerless to
plan for the future. These refugees are susceptible to recruitment into
military groups from their country of origin or within the host country.
In the case of Palestinian refugees, the development of organized
militias is a factor in the ongoing conflict and violence between these
groups and the Israeli army.
Following the withdrawal of Egypt from the Gaza Strip in
1956, Palestinian refugees in the territory found themselves under strict
Israeli occupation. Confrontation and resistance to this occupation
created a strong sense of unity among displaced Palestinians and was
the catalyst for the development of the Palestinian Liberation
Movement (Al-Shuaibi 1979). One publication of this movement called
for militarization, "Our entity has been wrested from us. To arms, to
arms, sons of Palestine .. .Into battle for the revival of your dignity and
your obliterated entity." (Al-Shuaibi 1979:8, quoting the magazine
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Filastinuna). This guerilla movement and the later formed Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) initially had little military impact on
Israel, but the mobilization and intensification of armed Palestinians
lead directly into the June 1967 war (AI-Shuaibi 1979, Khalidi 1991).
Finally, with a refugee status that affords them no rights under
international law or protections from increasing human rights violations
and with the growing radicalization and militarization of settlements,
displaced Palestinians are seeking solutions to their protracted plight.
Three 'durable solutions' to long-term refugee conditions are
recognized by international organizations, NGOs, and states alike. In
their 2005 Human Rights Resolution, the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) "calls upon States to
promote conditions conducive to the voluntary return of refugees in
safety and with dignity and to support the other two durable solutions
of local integration, or resettlement where appropriate" (OHCHR 2005:
4).
The Department of International Protections Resettlement
Handbook (2004) asserts that the three solutions are complimentary and
can function simultaneously as they did in situations for Bosnian
refugees in the mid-1990s and for Afghan refugees in the early 2000s.
These solutions - voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and local
integration - all have distinct advantages and disadvantages. Each
solution is an attempt to restore basic human rights to refugees and
provide a permanent and successful resolution to the refugee condition.
In fifty years of exile, Palestinian refugees have, thus far, been unable
to achieve any of these durable solutions.
Local integration has been a strong focus of the international
community since the beginning of the diaspora. Palestinian refugees
were expected to readily be absorbed into the surrounding Arab
countries based on shared language, history, culture, and religion and
the UNRWA was expected to assist in this transition (Shiblak 1996).
Rather than easy integration, however, Shiblak (1996) notes that the
UNRWA has been ineffectual in this task and Palestinian refugees have
become more alienated and marginalized with time. This seems to be
attributed to both external and internal forces, as Palestinians are
resisting integration and host states are discouraging naturalization
efforts, following a strategy to keep pressure on the return to Palestine.
Successful local integration implies some measure of
naturalization, typically the acquisition of citizenship. The original
offer of refuge made by many of the Arab states was with the belief
that a solution would be found and that the refugees' stay was
temporary. With the passage of time, the growing number of refugees,
and no solution in sight, many of the host states expressed sympathy
for displaced Palestinians, but did not offer any avenues toward real
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integration. At the beginning of the diaspora, most Arab states issued
special refugee documents to Palestinians, with the exception of Jordan
which granted refugees Jordanian nationality (Shiblak 1996).
Residency in all host states is tenuous, however, as Palestinians are not
guaranteed rights comparable to citizens and are subject to deportation.
Shiblak suggests that the Arab states had a vested interest in
maintaining the refugee status of Palestinians, as it prevented "Israel
from evading responsibility for their plight" (1996:39). This formal
resistance to local integration was evident in policies that reinforced
refugee status. Following Arab League resolutions, specific policies
were put in place to prevent the naturalization of Palestinian refugees.
For example, marrying a female citizen of a host country would not
bestow residency rights to either the husband or their children. And,
children born in host states could not claim host nationality, although
they are afforded refugee status under UNRWA mandate (Shiblak
1996, UNRWA website 2006). Local integration thus thwarted, the
refugee identity is passed on from generation to generation in host
countries.
Third-party resettlement, likewise, has been an unsuccessful
solution to the protracted Palestinian refugee situation. With exclusion
from the 1951 Refugee Convention, few Palestinians have been able to
obtain full refugee status in North America or in Europe (Shiblak
1996). Again, the Arab states have drafted provisions to prevent thirdcountry resettlement just as they have blocked efforts at local
integration. By keeping Palestinians not just as refugees, but as an
exceptional, collective case of refugees, the Arab states can keep
international attention on their primary goals of repatriation to Palestine
and compensation to Palestinians by Israel (Akram 2002). As a
representative agency of Palestinians, the PLO has actively argued
against treating Palestinian refugees as individual cases who could
qualify for resettlement and has made "explicit requests that
Palestinians not apply for refugee status in the West" (Akram 2002:43).
This Palestinian and Arab strategy for repatriation hinges largely on the
belief that the international community in general, and the UN in
particular, bears responsibility for the refugee problem by enacting the
Palestinian partition plan in 1947 and legitimizing Zionist claims to the
land (Akram 2002).
The final durable solution in protracted refugee situations repatriation - has been the central goal for Palestinians and the most
difficult to achieve. Palestine, as the political entity many refugees left
in 1948, no longer exists. Palestinians remaining in the occupied
territories after 1967 are registered with the Israeli census as foreign
residents - regardless of whether they are living in their ancestral
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homeland or as refugees in settlements (Shiblak 1996). Despite recent
moves toward autonomy including more formalized political
organization and the withdrawal of Israeli settlers from Gaza and the
West Bank, Palestine remains fragmented and the on-going conflict
between Israelis and Palestinians is blocking refugee efforts to return.
Refugee Status and Palestinian Identity

Refugee status, with its entitlements and limitations, is a
designation that Palestinians both embrace and deny. It is apparent that
the process of becoming a refugee and the reality of remaining in exile
for decades has a strong influence on how Palestinians are viewed by
outsiders and how Palestinians view themselves. This notion of
identity is complex. An understanding of Palestinian identity, therefore,
requires a wide lens. We must examine identity both across the
Palestinian population and how it has changed through time.
Based on Identity Theory, Elbedour, Bastien, and Center
assert that "identity is a cognitive scheme closely related to specific
definitions in which we find ourselves" (1997:219). They also
acknowledge the importance of human agency in the development of
identity - where "people recognize that their power to influence their
material and social environments is critical to their ideas of who they
are" (Elbedour et al. 1997:219). While complex variables in our past
and present circumstances help us define our own identity, the process
of forming this identity is constantly in flux and is influenced and
reinforced not only by how we view ourselves, but how others view us.
In the case of Palestinian refugees, identity is not only influenced by
displacement, it is reinforced by how Palestinians view themselves and
how the outside world views Palestinians.
In his study of identity among young Palestinians in the West
Bank, Mi'ari cites concepts of identity outlined by Daniel Miller
several decades earlier:
Viewing identity as a social object frequently reevaluated by
the person and others, Miller distinguished between
objective public identity (the person as viewed by others),
subjective public identity (the person's perception how
others view him) and self-identity (the person as viewed by
the self) [1998:48].
Public identity, both subjective and objective, is a concept that is more
readily open for investigation. A quick glance at popular media sources
can demonstrate how particular groups of people are identified and,
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more often, stereotyped by others. But self-identity is "ultimately an
internal construct" and the problem with trying to understand the selfidentity of others is that we are always on the outside looking in
(Elbedour et al. 1997:221).
Even the attempt at understanding how individuals and groups
view themselves, however, can begin to narrow the divide between 'us'
and 'them' - whether that is Israelis and Palestinians, Westerners and
people of the Middle East, or any such populations of people. A
number of researchers have begun to examine Palestinian identity after
the diaspora. Mi'ari's (1998) look at Palestinian youth in the West
Bank yielded several key components of self-identity and placed these
sub-identities in a hierarchical order. He found that this group of
people identified themselves first and foremost as Palestinian (national
identity), followed by local identity (place of residence), Arab identity,
religious identity, and lastly clan identity (Mi'ari 1998). While this
study looked at a particular group within the Palestinian population, the
results are concordant with other studies and can be used as a basis for
discussion of Palestinian identity in general and the influence of
refugee status on this identity.
That national identity is the primary component of selfidentity for stateless persons should not be a surprising find. As
discussed earlier in this paper, refugees are stripped of many of the
markers of identity as a result of displacement and dispossession.
Education and employment credentials are often unacknowledged in
host states, rights to property are violated, and integration into new
communities is blocked. Therefore, titles like farmer, teacher, and
homeowner all become void in the refugee circumstance.
As
Palestinians are denied citizenship in Lebanon, Syria, and other Arab
states, they cling to a national identity that now lacks a material basis
(AI-Shuaibi 1979). In spite of commonalities in language, history,
culture, and religion, Palestinians felt betrayed by other Arab
governments and turned their focus toward national solidarity rather
than pan-Arab unity (Peteet 1995). Before the Palestinian National
Movement and the 1967 war, Palestinians were seen as a dispersed
group of refugees, not a unified society. It was not until the mid-1970s
that the term Palestinians became widely used and more recently the
term Palestine has come to represent the once occupied territories of
the West Bank and Gaza (Sharoni & Abu-Nimer 2004).
This resistance to exile and resistance to the legal designation
of refugees are strong motivators for nationalism in displaced groups.
In an examination of other long-term refugees in Africa, Nordstrom
notes that people resist in "complex and creative ways" and crafting
concepts of self-identity based on resistance to aggression can be a
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powerful conflict-resolution strategy (1998:103). At the same time,
embracing refugee status gives many Palestinians access to UNRWA
resources, however minimal, and legitimizes their right to return to
Palestine.
Within refugee groups, solidarity in national identity
strengthens in response to a real or imagined threat from an enemy
group. While Palestinian identity is fragmented along lines of
geography, experience, and legal status (Peteet 1996), a collective
identity and a sense of unity is formed in response to a common enemy
- Israel. In their research on identity formation as studied through
Palestinian and Israeli children's drawings, Elbedour, Bastien, and
Center (1997) found that in conflict situations self-identity is
influenced not only by membership within a particular group (in this
case Palestinians), but also with reference to the 'other' group
(Israelis).
And the inter-group identity (manifested through
nationalism) increases with the level of conflict: "the greater the
external (social) conflict the greater the tendency to align one's identity
with the group, and the greater the external placidity the greater the
tendency toward concern with individual identity" (Elbedour et al.
1997:226). In other words, those of us who live in relative peace have
the luxury of forming an identity around individualistic aspects of our
lives (e.g. fanner, teacher, and homeowner). Where conflict occurs to
the level that it has in the Middle East, identity is overwhelmed by
notions of 'us' and 'them.'
This nationalistic collective and individual identity of
Palestinians may prove to be the strongest barrier to peace. The
conflict is viewed in zero-sum terms, where each side " ... holds the
view that only one can be a nation: Either we are a nation or they are.
They can acquire national identity and rights only at the expense of our
identity and rights" (Elbedour et al. 1997:218, quoting Herbert
Kelman). This either/or national identity is reinforced internally in
many ways. A group identity has been passed from generation to
generation. Palestinians see themselves as victims of aggression and
pass this identity on to their children through stories of past horrors and
abuse (Elbedour et al. 1997). The past and present circumstances of
refugees (poverty, disaster, etc.) are explained to their children as a
consequence of the loss of their homes and land to Israeli-Jews (Peteet
1995).
An 'us' and 'them' mentality is coupled with a strong sense of
nostalgia for a Palestine that never was. Peteet (1995) proposes that
"refugeeness" is a process of becoming rather than a one time event,
and exile imbues refugees with nostalgia as a coping mechanism to deal
with unstable and uncertain circumstances. This was evident in my
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own experience working with Liberian refugees in Ghana. When
talking about Liberia, refugees who had been living in the camp for
almost 16 years described their homeland in terms that almost
completely negated the bloody civil wars that wracked the country for
decades.
In Palestinian settlements, national identity is reinforced by
recognizing the efforts of those individuals who resist the enemy.
Where education and opportunities are limited among displaced groups,
status is achieved by contributing to the struggle against Israel. Status
in the West Bank and Gaza is attained by participating in
demonstrations, throwing stones, and facing arrest, deportation, and
death (Elbedour et al. 1997). This status is even conferred to families
of those involved in the struggle. The Palestinian national movement
endows the mothers of martyrs with national icon status and maternal
sacrifice has become normalized in Palestinian society (Peteet 1997).
That Palestine itself is often referred to as a "mother" or the
"motherland" in poetry, prose, and song creates an interesting parallel
when considering notions of sacrifice.
The sense of place is also an important factor in creating the
.Palestinian identity and is directly tied to the refugee experience. In the
West Bank, the hand-painted street signs displaying names of martyrs
of the intifada (Arabic for uprising) can be viewed as an attempt of
refugees to claim space with symbols of resistance (Peteet 1995). A
common feature on the walls of Palestinian homes in the West Bank,
Gaza, or surrounding Arab states is a bronze map of Palestine - a
region that includes the contested territories as well as pre-partition
Palestine. Produced in PLO-financed workshops, these maps strengthen
ideas of nationalism and belonging to people scattered from their
ancestral homelands. Similarly, young Palestinians all over the Middle
East wear small gold maps of Palestine on chains around their necks
(Peteet 1995). Mi'ari (1998) found that many refugees who left their
villages or towns in the original diaspora still identify themselves with
those places that they left fifty years earlier.
Ideas about family and familial identity are affected by the
refugee experience. That clan identity ranks last on Mi'ari's list for
Palestinian youth in the West Bank is also not surprising. In leaving
villages and towns, refugees fractured the kinship and lineage systems
that had tied groups of people together for generations. In a rare
examination of Palestinians prior to the diaspora, Peretz (1977) writes
that many of the earliest refugees were Palestinian-Arabs from the
upper and middle classes. These families sought refuge with family or
friends in neighboring areas, until conflict pushed people further and
further away from their kin groups. Palestinian refugees now found
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themselves united more by the common experience of exile, rather than
a reliance on family bonds. In refugee camps in Lebanon, it was "not
uncommon for widows to prefer to live in proximity to others from [the
camp] rather than their own kin because of their common experience
and their awareness that in a situation of prolonged civil war their
presence was burdensome to family members" (Peteet 1995:183).
This disruption of kinship groups is evident by a clear
distinction between Palestinian refugees and non-refugees. A 1992
survey examining refugee and non-refugee conditions (housing,
amenities, occupation, home ownership, and wealth) found an
important difference. UNRWA registered refugees have a significantly
higher educational level than non-refugees, but are generally less welloff (Sayigh 1998). The study suggested that intact kinship groups
among non-refugees afforded these Palestinians more links between
groups and property, and this factor was more critical to household
income and status than educational background (Sayigh 1998).
Clearly, the refugee experience would influence concepts of identity,
shifting from a common family group to a common displaced group.
And, in the case of Palestinian refugees, not identifying with kin groups
has serious economic impacts.
This brings me to my last point on Palestinian identity and
refugee status. As demonstrated by the distinction between refugee and
non-refugee Palestinians, any discussion of Palestinian identity (and
refugee status, for that matter) should not generalize too much.
Palestinians are not one homogenous group of people with a single
identity. Self-identity by its very nature is individualistic and, while
there are commonalities like a strong sense of nationalism, we should
not assume that there is one typical Palestinian identity that represents
the group as a whole. Likewise, the experience of each refugee is
unique and has different effects on how each individual formulates
their own identity.
Palestinians of different genders, with different religious
beliefs, socio-economic backgrounds, and from markedly different
areas of traditional Palestine became refugees and have remained in
exile for decades. This common experience serves to unite them under
a national identity, but should not negate the diversity within the
refugee populations. In terms of gender, the refugee experience can
differ significantly for men and women. In her examination of genderbased discrimination of UN RW A policies, Cervenak (1994) found that
the UNRWA has adopted a patrilineal system of conferring refugee
status from generation to generation through the father. Palestinian
refugee women who marry non-refugees maintain their status and
access to UNRWA resources, but their children are ineligible for
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assistance. In contrast, the children of refugee men who marry nonrefugee women can register with UNRWA and receive assistance
(Cervenak 1994). While the UNRWA benefits have been called
minimal by many, access to food and health services can literally mean
the difference between life and death for impoverished children.
Peteet also makes a distinction between refugee men and
women in terms of mobility and how that has changed with time:
Because cultural constraints circumscribe female mobility,
women in refugee camps moved in more spatially bounded
areas. For women, the world exterior to the camps was an
alien and dangerous one ... During the era of Palestinian
military power in Lebanon, however, women moved with
safety in Lebanese areas but usually with less frequency than
men. Paradoxically, as danger approached and Palestinians
as a community were endangered, women's mobility was
enhanced. While trust in the world exterior to the camps was
completely suspended, Palestinians placed some trust in
Arab cultural practices that ensured the safety of women
during times of conflict [1995:176].
Thus the process of becoming a refugee and living in exile is
experienced differently by men and women, and would impact identity
accordingly.
Religion also played a role in a differential experience
between many Palestinian refugees. Before dispersion, roughly 88
percent of Palestinian peoples were Muslim and the remaining were
Christian (Khalidi 1991). In some host states, refugees were treated
differently based on religion. In states that enforced clear policies for
Palestinian refugees, like Lebanon, some exceptions were made.
During the 1950s and 1960s, nearly fifty thousand refugees were
granted Lebanese nationality. These refugees were overwhelmingly
Christians or those that had family connections (Shiblak 1996).
Knudsen (2005) suggests that the Lebanese government was
particularly sensitive to the numerical balance between Christians and
Muslims within their state. Naturalizing all Palestinian refugees (the
majority of them Sunni Muslims) would upset this "precarious
demographic balance" (Knudsen 2005:222). Instead, this decision
created a further division between Christian and Muslim refugees.
Gender and religion are just two examples of the many factors
that influence identity. And, like the many other components of
identity, these factors should be explored further in order to more fully
understand the diversity of identities within the Palestinian population.
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However, for this discussion, it is more important to recognize that
identity is created and influenced by a number of factors within and
between populations and the influence of various factors is differential
depending upon time and circumstance. While components like gender
and religion provide variation in Palestinian identity, it is my assertion
that refugee status is a powerful influence on Palestinian identity, in
general, and contributes to a collective sense of victimization and
nationalism among Palestinian people.
Conclusions
It is remarkable that Palestinians, Middle East states, and the
international community are still looking for solutions to a refugee
situation that was created more than fifty years ago. It is also evident
that, with time, problems associated with this situation and with the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict overall are becoming firmly entrenched in
the Middle East and increasingly resistant to change. Many refugees
are actively resisting assimilation in host countries and holding out for
repatriation. Other refugees and non-refugees within the contested
territories are using political and military power to challenge Israel's
actions in the West Bank and Gaza. While a number of international
and regional proclamations have affirmed the right of Palestinian
refugees to return, an apt question at this point is "a return to what?"
Peteet acknowledges that while a state is conceivable in the
West Bank and Gaza, "it cannot accommodate all diaspora
Palestinians" (1995:171). The magnitude and diversity of Palestinian
refugees mean that any durable solution to their plight must make
allowances for the complexity of the situation. The experiences of
Palestinians and the formation of self-identities are influenced by a
multitude of factors: refugee and non-refugee status, men and women,
place of origin, place of exile, religious beliefs, etc. The internationallyrecognized political organizations of Palestine cannot encompass all
Palestinians, as "dispersion deprives them of a single voice" (Sayigh
1998:22). Even the notion of a collective Palestinian identity steeped
in nationalism and resistant to change creates an internal and external
barrier to solving the refugee problem.
While the focus of this paper has been on refugee status and
Palestinian identity, any proposed resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict must also acknowledge the existence of an Israeli identity and
how both identities can influence the peace process. Just as Palestinian
identity is formed around two reference groups - their own and the
perceived enemy group, Israeli identity would be equally influenced.
Elbedour, Bastien, and Center argue that "it is a very safe assumption
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that children in Israel are undergoing the same identity problems as are
the children of the West Bank and Gaza" (1997:228).
While protracted refugee situations are found around the
world and encompass millions of displaced people, the scale and
longevity of the Palestinian refugee situation is unparalleled. There are
significant difficulties in resolving any protracted situation and in
shielding refugees from human rights abuses - even with the
intervention of the UNHCR and the rights and protections granted these
refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Palestinians are
categorically excluded from these rights and protections and the
UNRWA services provided to refugees have not moved them closer to
resettlement, local integration, or repatriation. The fact that refugees
have languished in exile for more than fifty years suggests that local,
regional, and international bodies all have a moral responsibility to reexamine the situation and provide new avenues for change.
Finally, in researching refugee status and its relationship to
Palestinian identity, it was not my intent to perpetuate ideas of a single,
homogenous group - rather, to identify commonalities and significant
factors that would contribute to the formation of identity (or more
appropriately multiple identities) within this population. The images
that are portrayed in Western media tend to depict the typified
Palestinian - nationalistic, radical, and militant - without understanding
the basis for this collective identity or acknowledging the diversity of
peoples that call themselves Palestinian. Only by understanding the
conditions that create stateless persons and the incredible circumstances
in which they live can we move one step closer to resolving the
problem for at! refugees in the Middle East and around the world.
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